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ABSTRACT 
This paper aims at creating the necessary awareness that could bail out developing economies from 
continuous living in squalor. It highlights the major global economic and financial reforms as championed by 
the Basel III standards stipulated by Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS), which G-20 instigated. The paper presents a brief history of what led to Basel III 
standards and the lessons from it. It presents the Basel III global capital adequacy requirements and the 
relativity of the reforms to developing countries’ banking institutions. In conclusion, suggestions are made on 
what the way forward ought to be for the developing countries. Summarily, there is the view that economic 
and financial reforms should not hamper, but enhance economic growth in the developing countries. Hence, 
the need to end the stunting roles that local economic and financial regulators play to compare with their peers 
in the developed economies.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The cause of the global economic and financial reforms, of which impacts are being deliberated today, is the 
recent global financial crises (GFC). In turn, the causes of the GFC could not be divulged from failure of 
some advanced countries’ monetary policies to contain local financial imbalances, flaws in global financial 
regulation and supervision, weak global financial architecture, and global financial imbalances (Morgan and 
Pontines, 2013). 
As one of the causes of the GFC, the group of thirty (G-30) identified gaps and weaknesses in the coverage of 
prudential regulations and supervision of the global financial system (GFS). Secondly, the group identified 
lapses in the quality and effectiveness of prudential regulations and supervision. Thirdly, G-30 identified 
lapses in transparency, risk management, and corporate governance of financial institutions. 
The G-30 constitutes core professionals experienced in economic and financial management in Europe and 
America. The group made some corrective recommendations to fix the identified lapses in 2008. Later, the 
group of 20 came into the scene. The G-20 is made up of financial experts in economic and financial 
management in Europe, America, Asia and South Africa.  
The G-20 has since 2009 London summit been trying to fix the identified problems. The group has come up 
with Basel 1, Basel II and Basel III Accords. All sum up to establishing minimum standards for financial 
institutions’ resilience globally, so as to prevent a recurrence of GFC. 
2. THE REFORMS 
Basel I focused on setting minimum standard of capital adequacy requirements for financial institutions as 
stipulated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FAB). 
 Researchjournali’s Journal of Finance 
  Vol. 4 | No. 1  February | 2016  ISSN 2348-0963                        3 
 
 
  
www.researchjournali.com 
Basel II focused on aligning risk management with capital adequacy requirements for financial institutions as 
stipulated by the FSB. Basel III on its own focuses on strengthening the quantity and the quality of banks 
capital to improve their resilience and avert crises. Its focus on this dimension led to the introduction of 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in the short run, and the net stable funding ratio 
(NSFR) at the long run. Please see annexure 3. 
In the words of Morgan and Pontines, the financial regulatory issues already finalized include the 
requirements for greater quality and quantity of capital, minimum liquidity requirements, leverage ratio, 
standards for over the counter derivatives markets, surveillance on and regulation of systemically important 
financial institutions, and compensation for compliance. Other issues debated include strengthening oversight 
on shadow banking, credit rating agencies, compliance with international accounting standards, development 
of macro-prudential frameworks and tools, and adherence to international supervisory and regulatory 
standards. 
Basel III mandates increases in the minimum common equity capital ratio of banks from 2% to 4.5%. It 
increased minimum Tier 1 capital ratio from 4% to 6% in year 2015. Tier 1 capital includes deferred tax 
assets, mortgage servicing rights, and shares of financial institutions. Not that alone, Basel III rules introduce 
a capital conservation buffer that would start in 2016. This buffer is expected to be 2.5% by the year 2019. All 
these aim at increasing the resilience of banks during periods of crises as witnessed between 2007 and 2009 in 
US. Kindly see annexure 1. 
Apart from Basel Accords, there is the Volcker Rule that was enacted in 2010 by US Dodd Frank legislation. 
Volcker Rule proscribes banking institutions from acquiring or retaining ownership interest in, or sponsoring 
a private equity or hedge fund in the US.  
 
3. THE REFORMS’ ASSESSMENT   
The innovations to financial stability and trade growth should be highly commended. The CAR put a floor 
under banks capital adequacy. This is a key micro-prudential tool introduced in Basel III reforms. It impacts 
on the quantity and quality of capital that banks should hold to absorb losses. It is therefore a primary 
regulatory tool. Dewatripont and Triole (1993), as cited by Kasekende et al, stated that CARs are theoretically 
justified as a micro-prudential tool. The reason is that CARs serve as incentives to banks. It aids banks 
abstinence from taking excessive risks that could jeopardise the worth of their assets’ portfolio.  
The other micro prudential tool introduced in Basel III is that of liquidity requirements. Basel III introduces 
LCR and NSFR.  The use of retail deposits in funding assets used to dominate the practice of banking in 
developing countries. The practice is inferior to the use of wholesale funds. With Basel III liquidity ratio 
requirements, banks in the developing countries would have to switch to the use of wholesale deposits in 
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funding their assets. Hence, as financial structures develop in the developing economies and continually get 
more integrated into the GFS, it becomes more imperative for banks in developing economies to engage the 
use of wholesale deposits sourced from both local and foreign sources. It is in view of this that Basel III 
introduces the LCR and the NSFR. 
The LCR is more sophisticated than the liquidity assets ratio that banks in developing countries use to cover 
partial withdrawal of deposits. LCR requires banks to hold adequate high quality liquid asset to cover all 
possible sources of liquidity pressures over a 30-day period, under stressed conditions. The reason for this is 
that wholesale deposits constitute a much less stable source of funds than retail deposits. The effect of the 
introduction of LCR and the NSFR is that their adoption would influence the zeal and confidence in 
developing countries’ banks to take on wholesale foreign deposits, as they got integrated into the GFS, 
thereby increasing their capacity. 
  
4. MACRO PRUDENTIAL POLICIES 
4.1 COUNTER - CYCLICAL CAPITAL 
One should note that a lesson learnt from the occurrence of the GFC is that micro prudential policies alone 
could not take care of the malfunctioning of the existing financial system, due to the negative externalities 
that aggravate systemic risks. Hence, when individual financial institutions (protect their own solvency) 
complying with micro prudential regulations; there is the need for macro prudential policies to guide the 
institutions in order to avert systemic instability. 
It is in consideration of the fact that micro prudential regulations coupled with deposit insurance rules and 
central banks regulatory facilities could not prevent GFC that Basel III introduced some macro prudential 
measures. There is the introduction of counter-cyclical capital buffer. This buffer is at 2.5% of Risk Weighted 
Assets. The intent of this is to contrite excessive credit growth that would have manifest by the pro-cyclicality 
of foreign capital inflow. 
4.2 PRO - CYCLICAL CAPITAL 
Apart from the counter-cyclical measure that was introduced, Basel Accords introduced pro-cyclical measure. 
This aims at dampening cyclicality of the minimum liquidity requirements, while promoting stronger 
forward-looking provisioning against expected loan loss. This at the same time introduces capital 
conservation. 
In the words of Calice, countries could alleviate the pro-cyclicality of CAR by having two levels of regulatory 
capital: the officially disclosed minimum and an extra cushion. The officially disclosed minimum would be 
enforced, while the extra cushion would be raised during periods of sustained growth, but reduced during 
 Researchjournali’s Journal of Finance 
  Vol. 4 | No. 1  February | 2016  ISSN 2348-0963                        5 
 
 
  
www.researchjournali.com 
downturns. Such an arrangement would base on clear rules, so as to promote transparency, credibility, and 
protect supervisors from undue political and lobbyist pressures. 
4.3 RE-ASSESSING THE IMPACTS 
The innovations to financial growth and stability are highly commendable. Moreover, as good as the 
requirements and stipulations are, there are associated costs, even though there are benefits. Besides, there are 
some suspected flaws, which necessitate re-assessing the effects of these reforms. To some school of thought, 
these notable flaws probably stem from the inability of the G-20 to have some representatives of developing 
countries as members. Although three consultative documents were reportedly circulated by G-20 soliciting 
comments throughout year 2010, data collected through these documents have proved inadequate. One 
wonders the extent of participation of Asian and African developing countries financial representatives in the 
survey. 
It is no news that Basel III requirements have been able to strengthen the resilience of banks globally. The 
fact remains that the associated costs of such benefit on real outputs are more negative on the developing 
economies than on developed economies. CAR and liquidity requirements reduced the lending ability of 
banks globally. Yet the ability to secure requisite finance is crucial to the emergence of the developing 
countries. Not only was the supply of trade finance reduced, long-term loan-able funds increased in costs. 
Morgan and Pontines state that a number of potential problems, which Basel III generated for Asian 
economies are been identified. These include among others restricted lending and reduced economic outputs, 
increased cost of capital, and the possibility to constrain issuance of convertible bonds. 
In the words of Pietro Calice (2010), the financial sector in most African countries differs substantially from 
those in industrialised countries. Yet, some of these countries already had undergone all-inclusive banking 
reforms. Hence, the sector was adequately capitalised prior to Basel III standards. Besides, with much smaller 
banking structure and less developed capital markets, African banking interests and needs are different. The 
global economic and financial reform agenda ought to note and consider this. 
Moreover, in the perspective of some school of sort, macro prudential measures as proposed in Basel III 
would not likely be sufficient to mitigate systemic risks in Africa. According to the school, even thou macro-
prudential regulations are relevant to Africa, the ones proposed in Basel III do not address perfectly the 
systemic threats from foreign capital inflows mediated through the banking system. Kasekende et al 
submitted that African countries need a wider array of instruments, such that could restrict large loan 
concentration and foreign exchange exposures. 
Kasekende et al declare that even though the CARs aim at strengthening the resilience of banks against 
insolvency, there are other approaches that could have been strengthened by regulations, which reduce the 
risk factors in banks accumulation of assets. Alternatively, there could have been regulations that could raise 
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the share of risk-free assets in banks’ total asset portfolio, relative to risky assets. Yet the efficacy of a given 
minimum statutory CAR depends on the risk factor in the composition of banks asset portfolios. 
Further faults were found in CAR in that it is doubtful if the minimum global standard approach could protect 
banks in such a volatile environment as in developing countries. In addition, reference was made to the 
prevalence of non-performing loans in Africa. In 2009, for instance, banks non-performing loans ranged 
between 2 to 19% as a share of total loans, with an average of 9%. This is said to be three times as the level in 
advanced economies in 2009. 
Kasekende et al therefore suggest that CAR ought to be supplemented with regulations that reduce risk factors 
(like restrictions on large loan concentration, insider lending, and foreign exchange exposures). In addition are 
such regulations that raise the share of risk free assets in the total portfolio (e.g. government securities or 
banks reserves held by the central banks). 
While assessing the Basel III’s introduction of counter-cyclical capital buffer of 2.5% of Risk Weighted 
Assets, Kasekende et al considered it too low. The buffer is said to be too low to contain excessive credit 
growth in African banking systems and could therefore be ineffective. A reason adduced to this is that the 
cause of credit growth in developed economies, which informed the postulation of 2.5% of risk-weighted 
assets (RWA), is quite different from the causes of credit growth in Africa. 
Kasekende et al identified five main sources of credit growth or crunch in Africa. These include volatile 
external capital inflows or financial distress in cross border banks, unexpected economic upturns or 
downturns, credit concentrations or contractions in dominant sectors of the economies, distress of 
systemically important financial institutions, and hybrid of the combination of any of the four sources.  
Carauna (2010) as cited by Kasekende et al stated that direct credit curbs and loans to value ratios have been 
in use in East Asia, to dampen the pro-cyclicality of credit, before the introduction of Basel III standards. Yet, 
a fixed percentage of total outstanding loans are being set aside by banks in some African countries as an 
element of expected loss in their provisioning requirements. 
Nevertheless, one should note that the systemic risks that do emanate from external capital flows are not 
tackled in Basel III Accords. Equally is the issue of cross-sectional aspects of systemic risks. Basel Accords 
failed to address the issue of untoward large credit exposures of banking system that exist in not well-
diversified economies. The effect of this cannot be divorced from the practice of shadow banking, which is 
inimical. 
Conclusively, Kasekende et al highlighted that African banks face greater risks relative to their counterparts 
in advanced countries. Besides, loans issued by African banks are less diversified. Yet, weaknesses in the 
African legal system impede loans recovery. 
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Moreover, while Bernabe and Jaffar (2013) argue that banks in developing countries could meet with the set 
CAR through issuance of new shares, retained earnings and reduced loans, Kasekende et al counselled more 
progressively. Kasekende et al counselled that African banks should not increase their CAR by reducing their 
RWA, so as not to jeopardise economic growth. Rather, the banks could increase their CAR through retention 
of their earnings, without having to reduce lending. One wonders if the retained earnings would not have 
affected the paid out dividends that equity holders would have invested in probably juicier investments. 
Moreover, Nnadozie (2011) posit that Basel regulations ought to base on global coordination, rather than the 
imposition of some regulatory standards by the developed countries on the developing countries. He 
expresses concerns about the instability of Euro and the US dollars, which could trigger further instability in 
the GFS. In his words, the EU and the US that are primary issuers of reserve currencies have already 
experienced serious debt problems. 
Nnadozie notes that the gap between the G-20 pronouncements and what is now being implemented is quite 
wide and becoming wider as years moved farther away from the immediate post crises period. According to 
him, in question is the capacity of many banks in developing countries to compete with bigger and more 
established international banks. 
Apart from Basel Accords, there is the Volcker Rule that was enacted in 2010 by the US via the Dodd Frank 
legislation. Volcker Rule proscribes banking institutions from engaging in proprietary trading. Under the rule, 
banks are prohibited from acquiring or retaining ownership interest in, or sponsoring a private equity or hedge 
fund. In addition to this, the rule outlaw banks from underwriting shares and from any market making 
activities (Morgan and Pontines). 
However, it is not clear why Volcker Rule exempts US government securities from the prohibition against 
proprietary trading as cited in Morgan and Pontines. The rule is therefore perceived by some quarters as being 
discriminatory relative to other securities.  Baxter (2012), as cited by Morgan and Pontines, asserts that such a 
rule could hinder banks liquidity and financial market development in developing countries. 
Besides, Dodd-Frank mandates the US Commodities Futures Exchange Commission to impose extensive 
regulation on OTC derivatives. These would significantly increase transaction costs. With such, Baxter, as 
cited by Morgan and Pontines, stated that in any transactions involving non- US counterparties, the entities 
involved would face double regulation. 
Should Basel Accords be to favour only banks’ resilience without considering the extent of negative impacts 
it has on GDP growth rates in the developing countries? These and more related questions are what regulators 
in developing countries should consider to rethink their position. It should be at the back of their minds that 
developing countries were not adequately represented in reaching the Basel Accords because of the failure of 
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their countries GDP growth to meet certain standards. Therefore, considerations relative to promoting GDP 
should be sacrosanct. 
Nevertheless, one should note the problems that cross border banking could pose for banks’ regulation. There 
are systematically important financial institutions (SIFI), which have major market share among banks in the 
developing countries. The imposition of CAR on SIFI to ensure their resilience may prove to be highly 
counterproductive. Yet, coordinating supervision between home and host regulators of these SIFI may prove 
difficult. 
It should be noted that Basel Accords do not state any regulation on external capital inflows. Yet, from 
macro-prudential view, the non-core liabilities, which pose the greatest risk, are short-term foreign currency 
liabilities. They could expose banks to credit risk, liquidity risk, and exchange rate risks (Kasekende et al). 
Meanwhile, it is disturbing that some regulators in Africa appear not satisfied yet with the minimum standards 
set and thereby agitating for further increases, their Asian counterparts are saying the Basel set standards are 
too high. The Asians claim that such set standards could contrite investible funds in the developing and 
emerging market economies. One should note that the set standards are not even static, but annually increases 
in phases. 
This perception corroborates studies done by the FSB and the BCBS (under the auspices of G-20), and IIF 
among others. Their findings are that bringing the global common equity capital ratio to the Basel agreed 
minimum and conservation buffer would result in a decline in real outputs growth rate. The IIF’s position on 
this is that the Basel III standards would cut economic growth in Japan, US, and Euro zone by three percent 
within the timeframe of five years (Bernabe and Jaffar). 
One should note that even though the three studies used different models, they arrived at the same conclusion. 
To buttress it, study done by the organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) did not 
disprove. They all conclude that banks’ higher capital requirements would lead to cumulative reduction in 
GDP. 
Realising that the above four studies based their findings on developed economies, Morgan and Pontines cited 
Parcon –Santos and Bernabe (2012) and Bernabe and Jaffar (2013) to present the effects of the Basel Accords 
on the economic growth of two developing countries: Philippines and Malaysia respectively. The two found 
that an increase in capital requirements of the banking institutions led to drops in real GDP of the two 
developing economies. Please see annexure 2. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, banks’ regulators in Africa ought to cultivate the habit of acting on scientifically researched 
facts rather than on mere perceptions. Acting on scientifically proven facts would yield more credible positive 
impacts than actions that base on mere perceptions.  
Besides, there appears the need for financial experts from purely developing countries (a semblance of G-30) 
to collaborate. They supposed to meet, deliberate, agree, and present financial policy statements, in 
conformity with Basel Accords, but which are pro GDP growth.  
If such a semblance group is continental, for instance, members would have known the peculiarities of their 
countries financial economy. Hence, the task of fine tuning global reforms that could impede sectoral growth 
would be complementary and be wholesomely progressive. 
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7. TABLES 
Annexure 1:  Timeline 
       
Basel III: Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems  
Capital 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018  2019 
Min. Core Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
(% of RWA) 
3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 
Capital Conservation Buffer (% 
of RWA) 
      0.625% 1.25% 1.875% 2.5% 
Min. Core Tier 1 plus Capital 
Conservation Buffer (% of RWA) 
3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.125% 5.75% 6.375% 7.0% 
Phase-in of deductions from Core 
Tier 1 
  20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 100% 
Min. Tier 1 Capital (% of RWA) 4.5% 5.5% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0% 
Min. Total Capital (% of RWA) 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 
Min. Total Capital plus Capital 
Conservation Buffer (% of RWA) 
8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 8.625% 9.125% 9.875% 10.5% 
Countercyclical Buffer 
Range between 0-2.5% 
(common equity or other 
fully loss absorbing capital 
            
Capital instruments that no 
longer qualify as Non-Core Tier 1 
or Tier 2 Capital 
Phased out over 10 year 
horizon beginning 2013 
(reduction of 10% per year) 
            
Liquidity Standard               
Introduction LCR and NSFR*     LCR     NSFR   
Leverage Ratio               
Introduction Leverage Ratio           
Leverage 
ratio 
  
        Note:  Italic numbers indicate transition periods and all dates are as of January 1st.      
                 Reporting to supervisory authorities is expected by January 1, 2012 for both.      
                 January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2017 – parallel run period. 
Source: Accenture 
 
Annexure 2:  Studies on impacts of Basel III Capital adequacy and liquidity standards on GDP growth (percent points) 
Study Country Methodology Impact 
Aver
age 
Cumul
ative 
Aver
age 
Cumul
ative 
Ave
rage 
Cumu
lative 
BCBS MAG 
(2011) 
15 OECD 
Countries 
Large scale 
macroeconomic models 
Achievement of Basel 
III standard overtime 
0.03 0.22         
    Reduced form models               
    
Bank augmented DSGE 
models 
              
BCBS LEI 
(2010) 
15 OECD 
Countries 
Large scale 
macroeconomic models 
One-percentage point 
rise in CAR; 
  0.09 0.08       
    Reduced form models 
Meeting liquidity 
requirements 
            
    
Bank augmented DSGE 
models 
              
IIF (2011) 
US, euro 
area, UK, 
Banking sector model 
Achievement of Basel 
III standard overtime 
        0.70 3.20 
  
Japan & 
Switzerla
nd 
                
OECD, 
Slovik and 
US, euro 
area, and 
IIF banking sector 
model and OECD 
Achievement of Basel 
III standard overtime 
        
0.05  
-  
0.15 
  
Cournede 
(2011) 
Japan macroeconomic model               
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IMF Roger 
and  
US and 
euro area 
DSGE model with 
financial frictions 
Achievement of Basel 
III standard overtime 
0.14 1.00 0.13 0.90 0.27 1.90 
Vlcek 
(2011) 
  and banking sector               
BSP Parcon-
Santos 
Philippine
s 
Panel VAR model 
One-percentage point 
rise in CAR 
0.01           
and Bernabe 
(2011) 
                  
Bernabe and  Malaysia Panel VAR model 
One-percentage point 
rise in CAR 
0.46           
Jaffar (2013)                   
Note:  
CAR= Capital Adequacy Ratio; GDP= Gross Domestic Product; BCBS= Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; MAG= Macroeconomic 
Assessment Group; OECD= Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development; DSGE= Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium; LEI= Long-
term Economic Impact; IIF= International Institute of Finance; VAR= Vector Auto-regression 
Source: As cited by Morgan and Pontines (2013) 
 
Annexure 3:  Basel III elements and key aspects 
Basel III elements                            Key aspects 
  Regulatory Capital • Raising quality, consistency and transparency of the capital base 
  
 
• Predominant form of Tier 1 Capital must be common shares and retained earnings (common equity Tier 1, [CET 1]) 
 
• Deductions have been harmonized and generally applied at the level of CET1 
  
 
• Tier 2 Capital instruments will be harmonized 
  
 
• Tier 3 Capital instruments will be eliminated 
  
  Risk Coverage • Raising capital requirements for the trading book and complex securitizations 
  
 
• Capital requirement for counterparty credit risk (CCR) based on stressed inputs 
  
 
• Capital charge for potential mark-to-market losses (credit valuation adjustment, [CVA]) 
  
 
• Raising counterparty credit risk management standards (e.g. wrong way risk) 
  
 
• Strengthening standards for collateral management and initial margining 
  
 
• Establishing strong standards for central counterparties (CCP) 
  
    Leverage Ratio • Introducing leverage ratio as a supplementary measure to the risk-based Basel II framework 
  
    Pro-cyclicality • Dampening cyclicality of the minimum requirements (e.g. through-the-cycle parameters) 
  
 
• Promoting stronger forward looking provisioning (expected loss approach)* 
  
 
• Introducing capital conservation buffer 
  
 
• Introducing countercyclical buffer 
  
 
• Addressing systemic risk and interconnectedness (e.g. capital surcharge for SIFIs)* 
  
    Liquidity Standard • Introducing liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) 
  
 
• Introducing net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
  
 
• Introducing common set of monitoring tools 
  
    
    Source: Accenture 
 
 
